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INTRODUCTION 
Mass aggregation of claims intensifies the regulatory effect of 
adjudication,1 multiplies defendants’ potential liability,2 and reaffirms 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Kara M. Moorcroft. 
 1. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class 
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 192 (2002) (arguing that the class action device delegates 
substantive rights to private persons instead of “politically accountable government agencies”); 
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through 
Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215–18 (2001) (noting the desire of 
“entrepreneurial” plaintiffs’ attorneys and “activist” judges to regulate through litigation); see 
also WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW AMERICA’S NEW LITIGATION ELITE 
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 99–128 (2003) (describing how plaintiffs’ lawyers attempted to 
regulate the gun industry through class action lawsuits). See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER 
ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 49–134 
(2000) (discussing the “virtues and vices” of class actions). 
 2. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1997) (likening 
class certification to judicial “blackmail” because it forces defendants into large settlements, 
despite the merits of the case, out of fear that a plaintiff-friendly court or jury will return a 
devastating verdict (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 
120 (1973))); see also Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy 
Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695, 1696–97 (1998) (“Even the question of the 
defendants’ liability, which should be a critical matter in the fashioning of a just solution, 
becomes submerged beneath the overwhelming volume of claims and the huge transactional 
costs of defending them.”); Judith Resnick et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: 
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 306 n.31 (1996) (arguing that 
aggregation “enables some plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring weak if not false claims in sufficient 
quantity as to require defendants to choose between settlement and bankruptcy”); cf. Bruce L. 
Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality 
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1399–1404 (2000) (proposing multiple, averaged 
trials to avoid the blackmail problem). But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class 
Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429 (2003) (rejecting the notion that class 
actions resemble blackmail and urging judges to refrain from using such “inflammatory 
rhetoric”). 
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the redistributive goals of civil litigation.3 Given the importance of 
certification decisions, it is not surprising that reformers have targeted 
not only the substance underlying certification, but also the process of 
deciding how and when to certify a class. For example, recent rule 
changes have expanded the availability of discovery prior to 
certification decisions4 and made interlocutory appeal available.5 In In 
re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation 
(Bridgestone II),6 the Seventh Circuit undertook perhaps the most 
ambitious of these reforms. After ordering decertification of a 
nationwide class that a federal district court had certified, the Seventh 
Circuit issued an injunction to prevent certification of the same 
nationwide class in state court.7 This decision broke new ground, 
diverging from the decisions of other courts of appeals and flouting 
traditional notions of injunctive relief, federalism, and preclusion.8 In 
light of the quagmire that defendants face from dozens of putative 
nationwide classes,9 it seems apparent that Judge Frank Easterbrook’s 
 
 3. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class 
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 522 (1997) (cataloguing criticism of class actions and noting 
how “[t]ogether, the combination of undemanding standards for class certification, loose 
pleading requirements, and expanded standards of tort liability has transformed the mass tort 
class action into a massive tool of redistribution”). 
 4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c), as amended in 2003, requires courts to decide 
whether to certify a class “at an early practicable time”—as opposed to “as soon as practicable,” 
the requirement before the amendment. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). This expansion of 
discovery, as the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules explains, is to be used not to evaluate the 
merits of a claim, but rather to “identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented 
at trial.” Id. advisory committee’s note. The rule amendment avoids “forcing an artificial and 
ultimately wasteful division between ‘certification discovery’ and ‘merits discovery.’” Id.  
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). The rule amendment was adopted in 1998, partly in response to 
Judge Richard Posner’s scathing critique of lax class certification standards in In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1298–1300. Linda S. Mullenix, Essay, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 
23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97, 101 (2001). 
 6. 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Bridgestone II]. The Seventh Circuit’s earlier 
decision to order decertification of the nationwide class, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tire 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003), is 
Bridgestone I. This Note uses similar “I” and “II” labels for other cases, referring to the 
certification decision as “I” and the discussion of injunctive relief as “II.” 
 7. 333 F.3d at 767. 
 8. See infra notes 68–75 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions of other courts). 
 9. This quagmire even led the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to discuss amending 
Rule 23 to grant preclusive effect to denials of certification, a solution that largely would have 
paralleled the Bridgestone II solution. See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text; see also 
Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee 348–51 (May 20, 2002), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing rule-based solutions to overlapping class 
actions); David F. Levi, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee: Perspectives on 
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opinion was a bold attempt to provide a much needed solution to the 
pervasive problem of overlapping putative nationwide classes10—
notwithstanding criticism that this attempt was unwarranted.11 
This Note analyzes the availability of injunctive relief, such as 
that that granted in Bridgestone II, to preclude putative class plaintiffs 
and their lawyers from pursuing a nationwide class action in state 
court after a federal court has already denied certification. Part I 
explains the problems and abuses inherent in class adjudication of 
claims and articulates why defendants are beginning to seek this type 
of injunctive relief. Part II then introduces the Bridgestone II decision 
and explores how other courts and commentators have largely 
ignored such a remedy. Finally, Part III critically assesses the 
doctrinal justifications for these injunctions by examining whether a 
denial of certification meets the requirements for issue preclusion. 
When a certification denial is interpreted in its proper constitutional 
context, it necessarily involves the same issues as any future 
certification decision—regardless of the liberality of any state court 
class action rule.12 This constitutional context, combined with the 
availability of interlocutory appeal for certification decisions, enables 
federal courts to enjoin putative class members from relitigating the 
certification decision in state court. 
I.  THE PROBLEM WITH AGGREGATIVE CLASS ACTIONS 
 Class actions have drawn considerable praise: commentators 
explain that they “correct the systematic bias that favors defendants 
over plaintiffs in mass tort cases”13 and make viable negative value 
 
Rule 23 Including the Problem of Overlapping Classes (May 7, 2002), in Advisory Comm. on 
the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, at 302, 315 (proposing solutions to the problem of 
“overlapping class actions in state courts”). 
 10. This Note uses the term “nationwide classes” to refer to any type of class action 
involving plaintiffs in a large number of states. For purposes of this Note, the distinction 
between a nationwide class and a multistate class, for example, stemming from the sale of gas 
leases in eleven states, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985), is 
negligible. The burdens on defendants and benefits for forum-shopping plaintiffs, see infra Part 
I, apply equally whether the actions are just multistate or fully nationwide. 
 11. See Gary Young, Class Action ‘Tort Reform’ Ruling, NAT’L L.J., July 7, 2003, at P5 
(noting that the decision “bowled over attorneys with its sweeping—and, some say, 
wrongheaded—curtailment of state court authority to certify nationwide classes after a federal 
court has declined to do so”). 
 12. See infra notes 114–37 and accompanying text. 
 13. David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 414 (2000). 
MOORCROFT FINAL.DOC 2/25/2005 2:31 PM 
224 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:221 
claims that otherwise would not be brought in court.14 Nonetheless, 
class actions often do more harm than good. Aggregation of claims 
sacrifices procedural fairness,15 whereas case-by-case adjudication of 
liability or damages gives litigants their proverbial day in court.16 
Further, class actions often do more than merely aggregate: 
“[S]ometimes they also distort the outcomes by imposing liabilities 
that are, when the transformations of substance and procedure are 
taken into account, far more onerous than a rule of simple 
multiplication will provide.”17 Finally, regulation through litigation 
neglects important democratic interests, as the “mini-legislation 
effected by class settlements must remain on a plane below that of 
duly enacted legislation precisely because class settlements do not 
entail anything approaching the degree of consensus demanded of 
legislation.”18 Fundamentally, the larger debate over class actions 
implicates the debate over the proper role of courts; if it is 
undemocratic for judges to expand law beyond the proper contours of 
 
 14. A negative value claim is one for which the cost of litigation would exceed the 
plaintiff’s potential recovery. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (explaining that class actions allow 
plaintiffs to pool claims that are too expensive to bring individually). 
 15. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 
432 (2001) (“Class action lawsuits deprive individuals of their own day in court. They wrest from 
each class member her own freedom in undertaking, or avoiding, litigation.”). 
 16. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 69, 74 (“Underlying our tradition of individual claim autonomy in substantial tort cases is 
the natural law notion that this is an important personal right of the individual.”). 
 17. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 478. Professor Victor Schwartz and his coauthors also explain how 
aggregation often benefits plaintiffs: 
Evidence indicates that the aggregation of claims increases both the likelihood that a 
defendant will be found liable and the size of any damages award which may result. 
Defendants are far more likely to be found liable in cases with large numbers of 
plaintiffs than in cases involving one or just a few plaintiffs. In addition, juries tend to 
treat all plaintiffs alike, regardless of their individual circumstances, so that the 
presence of one severely injured plaintiff will likely increase the damages awarded to 
all. 
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Essay, Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call 
for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 491–92 
(2000) (footnotes omitted). Certification of a class has been said to turn a $20,000 case into a 
$200 million dispute, see Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001), and 
leave the fate of an entire industry in the hands of a single jury, see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 18. Nagareda, supra note 1, at 198. 
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a statute or constitution, it is even more undemocratic for a single 
court to dictate policy for the entire country.19 
This uneasiness with aggregative litigation is magnified when the 
system is abused, as it often is.20 The problems inherent in the current 
system are many, but this Note emphasizes those problems that 
underlie injunctions against the certification of nationwide classes, 
dividing them into two distinct but overlapping categories: problems 
with multiple putative classes and problems with state court 
adjudication of nationwide classes. 
A. Multiple Putative Classes 
Although duplicative litigation over issues of liability and 
damages is often warranted because it is procedurally more fair than 
aggregative litigation, having multiple courts decide the issue of 
whether aggregation is preferable offers no advantages. Multiple 
certification decisions merely waste already scarce judicial resources 
and cause needless friction between courts.21 As one commentator 
notes, such duplicative litigation “is patently wasteful. . . . [and] 
smacks of an indefensible gamesmanship.”22 
 
 19. Cf. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 
27, 32 (2003) (explaining how judges “strain the boundaries of their institutional abilities” when 
they ignore their traditional judicial role by, for example, approving a class action settlement). 
 20. For a small sample of works criticizing the use of the class action device, see generally 
Lester Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of 
Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 243 (2001); Resnick et al., 
supra note 2; and Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1. For a good general bibliography of class 
action literature, see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 913, 915 n.2 (1998). 
 21. See James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention 
Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (1994) (“Such gross inefficiency is bound to cause 
friction, as one court finds itself the loser in a race to judgment, its resources squandered.”); 
Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee 105 (May 14, 2001), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2001.pdf (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (“The prospect that another court may certify the class may impel 
a federal court to grant a certification that otherwise would be withheld, believing that it is 
better to maintain control of a dubious class than to stand by helpless while another court 
pursues the same class to judgment.”); Levi, supra note 9, at 311 (noting that as federal courts 
become more deliberate and managerial in certifying classes or approving settlements, “an ever 
growing number of cases will be filed in those state courts where this kind of supervision is 
perceived to be less demanding,” often resulting in “multiple filings of multistate diversity class 
actions in both federal and state courts. . . . precisely the outcome that the class action device 
was designed to prevent”). 
 22. Rehnquist, supra note 21, at 1064; cf. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative 
Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigation Unit, 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 832–33 (1989) (noting that because “[c]ourts are a public resource . . . . 
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An even greater harm of multiple certification decisions is the 
harm beset upon defendants forced to face litigation that they can 
lose but never win. Professor Martin Redish extends this certification 
“blackmail” argument to include even threats of certification: 
A defendant is aware that its success in opposing class certification 
in 1, 2, or even 50 different courts would not preclude a 51st court 
from granting certification. The defendant thus must face the 
possibility of a constant stream of harassing filings. Hence, 
defendants are effectively forced to “buy” litigation peace, even 
where such payments are wholly undeserved, by settling.23 
In many cases, defendants and plaintiffs will spend two or three years 
battling over the initial certification decision in federal court. Fighting 
this same battle in multiple state courts, after it was fully and fairly 
litigated in the original federal forum, is fundamentally unfair.24 
B. State Court Adjudication of Nationwide Class Actions 
Although experimentation with rules, standards of liability, and 
even entire social schemes may demonstrate the beauty of 
federalism,25 such rules, standards, and schemes in the nationwide 
 
we have a right to insist that their services not be squandered” and arguing that the “duplication 
of effort is a major cause of the protraction of time needed to resolve cases and cannot be 
justified by plaintiffs’ selfish strategic desire”). 
 23. Martin H. Redish, The Need for Jurisdictional and Structural Class Action Reform, 32 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,984, 10,985 (2002); cf. David Hechler, GC’s Nightmare: EEOC 
Class Actions Are Up 43% Since 1997, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 29, 2002, at A19 (“Consumer products 
companies that depend on public goodwill are particularly vulnerable to bad public relations 
and may settle even before classes are certified . . . .”). 
 24. See In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 
1977): 
There are strong arguments that may be advanced for applying the rule of collateral 
estoppel to a class action determination when the plaintiff is engaging in multidistrict 
litigation. First, the evidence adduced in a fair hearing generally requires a substantial 
investment in discovery. A significant amount of judicial time is likely to be consumed 
in considering both the evidence amassed and the legal arguments arrayed in support 
of and in opposition to class action status. Second, assuming a fair hearing, a plaintiff 
ought not to have unlimited bites at the apple until he can convince a single district 
court that he qualifies as a class representative under Rule 23. This is wasteful and 
runs counter to the sound administration of multi-district cases. Third, the parties and 
the issues in the individual cases will normally be of sufficient similarity that a factual 
determination in a fair hearing should be conclusive in companion cases on principles 
of collateral estoppel. 
Without the availability of the certification-blocking injunction, plaintiffs will continue to get 
unlimited bites at the certification apple. 
 25. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
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class action context necessarily impose individual state values on the 
entire country. The purpose of federalism was never to allow a single 
local judge and jury to impose its decision on the rest of an unwilling 
nation. State court adjudication of class actions represents the worst 
of forum shopping with perverse effects: plaintiff-friendly 
jurisdictions result in easy certifications, big verdicts, and settlements 
larger than warranted.26 
Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court has made clear that a 
state court can adjudicate a nationwide class action—even of 
exclusively federal claims—that will have binding effect on class 
members who do not opt out, as long as the court meets certain 
constitutional notice requirements.27 Choice of law, however, provides 
an important constitutional limitation on the adjudication of 
nationwide classes.28 Without significant aggregation of contacts to 
the class claims, the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of 
the U.S. Constitution29 prevent the forum state from applying its own 
law.30 
This jurisprudence—allowing state court adjudication of 
nationwide classes—is ripe for abuse because of the slim chance that 
 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 26. See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of 
It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 153 (2001) (“What business does a state 
court judge elected by the several thousand residents of a small county in Alabama have in 
telling the state of Massachusetts what its laws mean?”). 
 27. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369, 372–73 (1996) 
(confirming the “preclusive effect of a state-court judgment, entered in a class or derivative 
action, that provides for the release of exclusively federal claims”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806–14 (1986) (holding that a state court had personal jurisdiction over 
absent class members who had limited or no contacts with the forum as long as it had met 
procedural notice and opt-out requirements). 
 28. See infra notes 121–37 and accompanying text; cf. RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. 
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 410 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he proper handling of choice-of-law 
issues in class actions remains somewhat unsettled. Shutts provides some outside constitutional 
limits, but there is limited choice-of-law doctrine to assist courts in navigating within those 
limits.”). 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”). 
 30. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 
(1981)). 
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the Supreme Court will review state court decisions.31 For example, in 
Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,32 an Illinois 
appellate court upheld a county court’s application of Illinois law 
across a nationwide class certified against State Farm.33 The Avery 
court held that an Illinois consumer fraud statute reached insurance 
transactions across the country.34 The jury had found State Farm 
liable for using generic automobile replacement parts in forty-eight 
states,35 even though several states had encouraged the practice to 
drive down consumer costs of insurance.36 After business groups, 
consumer advocates, and regulatory agencies exerted enormous 
pressure, the Illinois Supreme Court granted appellate review.37 As of 
this writing, however, it has failed to issue a decision,38 leaving other 
Illinois courts with the precedent that the Illinois Consumer Fraud 
Act extends to “protect” consumers across the entire United States.39 
Although it is questionable whether Avery could survive U.S. 
Supreme Court review,40 its implications have already been felt across 
the country.41 The Avery court’s decision is but one of many examples 
of the perverse effects of state court adjudication of nationwide class 
actions. In the past several years, a single court in Madison County, 
 
 31. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 224 (2001) (noting that the 
Court grants certiorari in about one hundred cases each year, chosen from more than seven 
thousand petitions). 
 32. 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), appeal granted, 786 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. 2002). For a 
powerful critique of Avery, see generally Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1. 
 33. Avery, 746 N.E.2d at 1257. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1261. 
 36. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 1, at 1230 & nn. 59–61 for a listing of statutes that 
discuss insurance company use of generic parts. 
 37. Avery, 786 N.E.2d at 180. 
 38. The Illinois Supreme Court granted review in October 2002 and heard arguments in 
May 2003, Daniel C. Vock, High Court Urged to Void $1 Billion Judgment, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., May 14, 2003, at 1, but as of October 20, 2004, had yet to rule. 
 39. See Clark v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc., 798 N.E.2d 123, 129, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) 
(noting that Avery was “precedent to which [it was] bound” and determining that the Illinois 
Consumer Fraud Act applied, “abrogating the need to apply the laws of all 50 states”). 
 40. See infra notes 128–33 and accompanying text. 
 41. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treatser, Generic Car Parts Makers Fighting Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 2000, at C8 (describing how sales of generic car parts dropped after the Illinois decision); cf. 
Joseph L. Bast, Editorial, Three Cheers—And a Sigh of Relief—For Boeing, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
May 17, 2001, at 33 (“Allowing certification of national classes whenever an Illinois corporation 
is accused of violating an Illinois law sanctions jackpot justice, with lawyers flocking to Illinois 
courts to make a quick buck by threatening multibillion-dollar lawsuits over business practices 
that are perfectly legal, and sometimes even required, in other states.”). 
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Illinois has certified dozens of class actions, many of them 
nationwide.42 
Even conceding that class actions serve a useful regulatory 
function,43 state courts with inherently local concerns should not force 
their regulatory preferences upon the entire United States, especially 
when a federal court has already decided that a class action is not 
appropriate.44 The probable lack of Supreme Court review of these 
state court adjudications only exacerbates the problems inherent in 
allowing local courts to make policy for the country. 
 
 42. See, e.g., LESTER BRINKMAN, ANATOMY OF A MADISON COUNTY (ILLINOIS) CLASS 
ACTION: A STUDY OF PATHOLOGY 6–7 (Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute, 
Civil Justice Report No. 6, 2002) (using Madison County as indicative of how plaintiffs’ lawyers 
have countered federal court class action scrutiny “by filing their would-be class actions in state 
court jurisdictions where judges are known or believed to be likely to act favorably toward 
plaintiffs’ counsel and where juries have a high propensity for favoring claimants over out-of-
state ‘big business’ defendants”), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjr_6.htm; 
Noam Neusner, The Judges of Madison County, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 39 
(“With a population of 258,941, Madison County has hosted 50 class action lawsuits so far this 
year, up from 39 the prior year.”); see also Beisner & Miller, supra note 26, at 185 (reviewing 
class actions filed in Madison County to conclude that judges there have been asked “to set 
national policy on issues that could affect the daily lives of millions of Americans throughout 
the country—from what water they drink to how much they pay for their next insurance policy 
or telephone bill—all from a small courthouse in southwest Illinois”). Madison County has 
acquired celebrity status on the editorial page and in congressional hearings. See, e.g., 149 
CONG. REC. H5281 (daily ed. June 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (discussing 
how “the only explanation for this phenomenon [the explosion of litigation in Madison County] 
is aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing 
accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases and setting policy for the entire 
country in a local court”); Editorial, Mayhem in Madison County, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2002, at 
A14 (discussing filings in Madison County as indicative of how “forum-shopping for class 
actions now has damaging nationwide economic consequences”). 
 43. This concession is quite debatable. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, supra note 9, at 327 (“[N]o lawyer should be able to march into court on behalf of 
millions of clients and ask a judge down in Plaquemine in Louisiana to decide that some 
pharmaceutical ingredient is harmful. I mean, that’s a job for the FDA.” (reporting the 
comments of Lewis H. Goldfarb, Esq.)). 
 44. See Beisner & Miller, supra note 26, at 205 (arguing that many nationwide class actions 
“are being heard by locally elected county judges, . . . who are often viewed by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers as willing to ‘rubber stamp’ class certification orders and ‘coupon’ settlements, and who 
are periodically forced to turn to the local bar to fund their efforts at re-election”); Levi, supra 
note 9, at 314 (“Individual state courts may properly apply the policy choices of the residents of 
that state to those residents. But local authorities ought not impose those local choices upon 
other states and certainly not on a nationwide basis.”). 
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II.  THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD ENJOINING  
NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS 
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules long ago recognized the 
problems of overlapping putative class actions and considered a rule 
amendment that would have given preclusive effect to a refusal to 
certify so that no other court could certify a rejected class.45 The 
Advisory Committee received many comments on the proposed 
amendment,46 but it ultimately decided that the amendment would be 
too substantive and thus would violate the Rules Enabling Act.47 
Courts, however, do not face such limitations and should, under 
appropriate circumstances, use their statutory and inherent powers to 
enjoin plaintiffs from pursuing certification of nationwide classes.48 
Although some courts have considered another court’s denial of 
certification when analyzing whether a class is maintainable,49 most 
courts have refused to grant preclusive effect to earlier denials of 
certification.50 For example, Tennessee courts have certified 
 
 45. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 21, at 40: 
A court that refuses to certify—or decertifies—a class for failure to satisfy the 
prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(1) or (2), or for failure to satisfy the standards of Rule 
23(b)(1), (2), or (3), may direct that no other court may certify a substantially similar 
class to pursue substantially similar claims, issues, or defenses unless a difference of 
law or change of fact creates a new certification issue. 
(quoting proposed Rule 23(c)(1)(D)). The committee explains that the possibilities for “abuse 
presented by unfettered opportunities to present the same class action to a different court . . . 
support a procedural mechanism permitting a court denying certification to make that denial 
binding on a subsequent, sufficiently similar, proposed class.” Id. at 34.  
 46. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 320–37 
(summarizing comments). 
 47. See Levi, supra note 9, at 315 (discussing the Rules Advisory Committee’s desire to 
provide more than “modest benefits” by addressing “overlapping class actions in state court,” 
but noting how “[t]here may be room to adopt valid rules provisions in the face of these 
[Enabling Act and other] objections, but to do so might test the limits of rulemaking authority 
thus inviting litigation over the rules themselves”). 
 48. This power stems from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), which states that 
courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Syngenta Corp. 
v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002), does not affect a court’s injunctive power, only its removal 
power. 
 49. See Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 822 (S.D. Ga. 1987) (giving preclusive 
effect to an earlier court’s denial of certification of a substantially similar class); In re Dalkon 
Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (E.D. Va. 1985) (giving preclusive effect 
to the decertification of a class). 
 50. See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Deere 
Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1994). The difficulties of overlapping classes 
illustrate this problem further. Even if a court did not expressly discuss the preclusion problem 
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nationwide classes without giving any notice to defendants;51 a 
Louisiana trial court has approved a settlement for a class deemed 
unfair by both a federal court and another state court;52 and a county 
court in western Illinois has certified classes deemed uncertifiable just 
about anywhere else.53 Given the procertification bent of some state 
 
when certifying a class, it should be aware of earlier denials of certification or the existence of 
an outstanding certified class. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), is 
representative of the worst of this phenomenon; the court actually noted that another court had 
denied a motion to certify a nationwide class action, but it failed to discuss the implications of 
this denial. Id. at 155 n.14. 
 51. Schwartz et al, supra note 17, describe one such certification:  
In a lawsuit filed against a major automobile manufacturer in a Tennessee state court, 
plaintiffs filed several inches of documents with their complaint. By the end of the 
same day the lawsuit was filed, the court certified a nationwide class of 23 million 
automobile owners—one of the largest class actions ever certified by any court. In its 
certification order, the court stated that it had conducted a “probing, rigorous review” 
of the matter, a practical impossibility given the few hours allotted the review and the 
utter lack of thoughtful response to the plaintiff’s motion. 
Id. at 501–02 (footnotes omitted). The authors further argue that this ex parte certification 
“offends notions of due process and fundamental fairness” because “it can be very much an 
uphill battle for the defendant to change the judge’s mind after the fact.” Id. at 502. Before a 
change in court composition, Alabama was also infamous for ex parte certifications. See Linda 
S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class 
Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1718 (2000) (“[I]n a forum that liberally granted 
class certification to almost every case in which it was requested, the Alabama Supreme Court 
has engaged, in the last eighteen months, in an astonishing reversal of class certification 
decisions.”); Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 499 (“[O]ver a recent two-year period, a state 
court in rural Alabama certified almost as many class actions (thirty-five cases) as all 900 federal 
district courts did in a year (thirty-eight cases)). See generally OLSON, supra note 1, at 231–32 
(describing “drive-by” certifications in Alabama and Tennessee). 
 52. See White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 718 So. 2d 480, 491 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing and 
remanding the trial court’s decision to approve a settlement class); White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
835 So. 2d 892, 901–08 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (reviewing the trial court’s decision to approve the 
settlement class on remand). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, though refusing to enjoin the 
Louisiana settlement after having vacated a similar federal court settlement, criticized the 
settlement in a lengthy opinion, explaining that it “was inadequate and unreasonable, and may 
even have been a marketing boon” to the defendant. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 819 (1995); see also id. at 803 (questioning whether 
the adequacy of representation requirement could be met when “class counsel effected a 
settlement that would yield very substantial rewards to them . . . [for] little work”); Rhonda 
Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 465–71 (2000) (discussing the litigation 
in detail); infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. A Texas appellate court also found a lower 
court’s approval of a similar statewide settlement to constitute abuse of discretion because it 
was not “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Bloyed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422, 426 
(Tex. App. 1994). 
 53. See Neusner, supra note 42, at 39 (“Consider [one case that] alleges that [the 
defendant] uses a faulty database to decide appropriate medical treatment and payment for 
certain kinds of claims. Similar cases have been filed across the country, all seeking nationwide 
class action status. None succeeded before, but in Madison [County], one did.”); see also supra 
note 42 and accompanying text. 
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courts, a system in which courts would honor (by giving preclusive 
effect to) other courts’ denials of certification might be an 
improvement but seems unlikely to come about.54 
Thus, given the unlikelihood of a rule amendment and courts’ 
reluctance to give preclusive effects to denials of certification, the 
only nonlegislative way to prevent relitigation of a certification 
decision is by injunction. This Part discusses defendants’ efforts to 
obtain such injunctions, culminating in Bridgestone II, in which the 
Seventh Circuit enjoined putative class plaintiffs from pursuing a 
nationwide class action in state court. 
A. Avoiding the Anti-Injunction Act: Enjoining Competing Classes 
Because an injunction is a “highly intrusive remedy,” traditional 
principles of comity, federalism, and equity counsel that federal 
courts exercise hesitation before so intruding upon state court 
matters.55 The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) codifies this unwillingness 
to intrude into state matters by forbidding a federal court from 
issuing an injunction unless it falls within one of three exceptions.56 
Preventing “needless friction” between federal and state courts 
justifies the AIA and its presumption against injunctive relief.57 
Much has been written concerning the availability of federal 
court injunctive relief in the class action context.58 The problems of 
 
 54. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 326 
(“Another approach would be to encourage the states to enact similar, parallel, or reciprocal 
rules; but there is reason to be concerned that not all states will go along—particularly the states 
that are more likely to permit improvident certification.” (reporting the comments of Thomas 
Y. Allman, Esq.)); Levi, supra note 9, at 317 (noting the need for expanded federal subject 
matter jurisdiction because “[i]t is very difficult for any single state court to fairly resolve these 
problems, and nearly as difficult for state courts to act together in shifting ad hoc arrangements 
for cooperation”). 
 55. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1985). 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000) (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to 
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”).  
 57. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232 (1970) (quoting Okla. Packing Co. v. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939)). This presumption is so strong that the Supreme Court has cautioned 
that the exceptions to the AIA should not be “enlarged by loose statutory construction,” Chick 
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988). Further, “doubts as to the propriety of a 
federal injunction against state court proceedings” should be resolved against issuing the 
injunction. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970). 
 58. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 52 (reviewing exhaustively the law and policy 
surrounding competing classes); Andrew S. Weinstein, Note, Avoiding the Race to Res Judicata: 
Federal Antisuit Injunctions of Competing State Class Actions, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085 (2000) 
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competing class actions are well known: they waste judicial resources, 
confuse class members receiving multiple notices of suit, and may 
create a “race to the bottom” favoring settlement.59 These negative 
implications of overlapping class actions, particularly actions filed in 
what have been termed “drive-by” certification courts on the eve of a 
federal settlement,60 necessitated an expansion of the use of 
injunctions to prevent these overlapping classes.61 This type of 
injunctive relief—prohibiting another class action from proceeding 
when a federal court is close to settlement—typically falls under the 
“necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to the AIA, and even 
this exception is not without criticism.62 
Curiously, though, the commentary regarding this type of 
injunctive relief, what this Note calls the “settlement-protecting 
injunction,” does not seriously consider the possibility of enjoining 
future class actions when no class action is or will be pending in the 
given federal forum. For example, a leading treatise discusses only 
whether the court can force litigants into a “particular federal class 
 
(arguing for an expansion of the use of antisuit injunctions against competing state class 
actions); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1996) 
(discussing the problems of duplicative filings in large-scale litigation); cf. 18 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4425, at 531–33 & n.11 
(2d ed. 2002) (“A good argument can be made that . . . it should be permissible for a federal 
court to enjoin state proceedings that would interfere with efficient disposition of a federal class 
action.”). See generally Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and 
Preclusion: Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 925 
(discussing an American Law Institute proposal for expanded use of antisuit injunctions in the 
“transfer-removal-consolidation scheme” and how it could be extended to class actions). 
 59. Weinstein, supra note 58, at 1085. 
 60. Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 501. 
 61. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholding an 
injunction preventing the plaintiffs from prosecuting a putative class in state court “[g]iven the 
concerns of the district court to finalize the settlement and given the time invested in reaching 
that goal”); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 338 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding a 
settlement-protecting injunction); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 
1335 (5th Cir. 1981) (same). For a good overview of the subject, see In re Diet Drugs 
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation, 282 F.3d 220, 233–
40 (3d Cir. 2002), and the sources mentioned in note 58, supra. 
 62. See, e.g., In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180–84 (8th Cir. 1982) (vacating a 
district court order that certified a mandatory class and prohibited the plaintiffs from litigating 
punitive damage claims in state courts, on the ground that the order violated the AIA); see also 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910 (1987) (“Although federal 
courts may try to limit the proliferation of parallel actions by enjoining plaintiffs from bringing 
suit in state court or by staying state discovery proceedings, the Anti-Injunction Act denies 
federal courts the power to stay preexisting state actions.”). 
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action forum.”63 This view presumes that the court issuing an 
injunction (or other type of remedy for defendants) has already 
certified a class action. Professor Linda Wasserman’s lengthy article 
on dueling class actions spends just two paragraphs on what this Note 
calls the “certification-blocking injunction,”64 concluding that “the 
protections and limitations built into preclusion doctrine . . . provide 
litigants with opportunities to ‘repackage’ class actions rejected by 
one court and file them in another court.”65 Other scholarly works do 
not even mention certification-blocking injunctions, focusing instead 
on the settlement-protecting injunction.66 
In the cases discussed in Sections B and C, however, defendants 
sought injunctions remarkably different from the settlement-
protecting injunctions that courts typically grant: they sought to 
enjoin future class actions when no class action was currently 
proceeding in federal court. Instead of asking for protection from a 
competing class action in a different forum, defendants asked federal 
courts to help them avoid lengthy rounds of litigation in other forums 
over the certification decision already litigated. In Bridgestone II, for 
example, the defendants asked the Seventh Circuit to issue an 
injunction preventing certification of any class related to the 
litigation.67 
B. Early Rejections 
Nearly a decade ago, the Fifth Circuit declined to enjoin state 
courts from certifying a class that the district court had refused to 
certify.68 The court remarked, “While we are sympathetic to [the 
defendant’s] desire to avoid another protracted and costly round of 
 
 63. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1798.1, 
at 435 (2d ed. 1986). 
 64. The term “certification-blocking” encompasses both denials of certification and 
decertifications, although there may be a distinct analysis of the two. It is beyond the scope of 
this Note to discuss the circumstances, if any, under which a district court’s decertification is 
entitled to less preclusive effect than an appellate court’s decertification. 
 65. Wasserman, supra note 52, at 487–88. In discussing injunctions issued on the basis of 
the relitigation exception to the AIA, Professor Wasserman notes the apparent lack of finality 
of certification decisions before the addition of subsection (f)—providing for interlocutory 
appeal—to Rule 23 in 1998, id. at 516 n.289, but concludes that the “utility of such an injunction 
. . . is quite limited, and even when available, may be ‘too little, too late,’” id. at 516–17. 
 66. None of the sources in note 58, supra, mentions the potential use of certification-
blocking injunctions, except to the extent discussed above. 
 67. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 68. J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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litigation over class certification . . . the Anti-Injunction Act requires 
a different result.”69 In a short discussion, the court concluded that an 
order denying certification lacked finality because it was not likely 
appealable and was therefore not a final judgment.70 This lack of 
finality, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, placed the certification decision 
outside the scope of the relitigation exception to the AIA, which is 
grounded in principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.71 
On much the same reasoning, the Third Circuit refused to grant 
an injunction to prevent relitigation of a certification decision.72 The 
Third Circuit had earlier vacated the district court’s order to both 
certify a nationwide class and approve a proposed settlement.73 In 
refusing to intervene in a state court’s certification of a nearly 
identical class, the court noted that state courts were not bound by 
federal interpretations of Rule 23 and could certify nationwide classes 
according to state law standards.74  
Both of these courts relied heavily on finality and appealibity 
considerations; before 1998, interlocutory appeal was not available 
for certification decisions. Yet even after certification decisions 
became appealable, a defendant’s potential remedy of enjoining 
putative plaintiffs from pursuing certification in another forum after 
an earlier denial remained elusive until Bridgestone II.75 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. (“Because finality is central to the ‘concepts of both res judicata and collateral 
estoppel,’ which animate the Anti-Injunction Act, such a lack of finality is also fatal to a request 
for injunction under the Act.” (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 
(1988))). 
 72. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 
146 (3d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter GM II] (“[D]enial of class certification under these 
circumstances lacks sufficient finality to be entitled to preclusive effect.”). 
 73. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d 
Cir. 1995) [hereinafter GM I]. 
 74. See GM II, 134 F.3d at 146 (“[O]ur construction of Rule 23 and application to the 
provisional settlement class is not controlling on the Louisiana court.”). 
 75. See Young, supra note 11 (“[Bridgestone II] is the first time a federal court has said that 
the denial of certification has a preclusive effect on state court proceedings.” (quoting class 
action defense attorney John Beisner)). In 2000, the Eighth Circuit enjoined plaintiffs from 
bringing state court class claims premised on identical “factual allegations” and “the same issues 
as a case dismissed without prejudice in federal court.” Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 
1005, 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2000). Although resulting in an injunction resembling the one issued 
in Bridgestone II, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning focused not on the finality of the certification 
decision but instead on the plaintiffs’ lack of standing in the case. Id. at 1015. Indeed, the court 
cited in dictum the cases discussed in Part II.B of this Note and stated: “We recognize that 
denial of class certification alone does not constitute a final judgment on the merits sufficient to 
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C. Bridgestone II: The Perfect Test Case? 
In May 2003, the Seventh Circuit issued the Bridgestone II 
opinion, surprising many commentators with its willingness to enjoin 
plaintiffs from pursuing any type of nationwide class action.76 Yet the 
remedy was hardly shocking, given the startling facts surrounding the 
massive litigation. Regulators ordered the recall of more than ten 
million tires after tread separation on the tires was linked to accidents 
causing 271 deaths and more than 700 injuries.77 Ford and 
Bridgestone/Firestone settled hundreds of personal injury lawsuits 
stemming from these rollovers and tire blowouts.78 Groups of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys also filed consumer actions in at least twenty-
seven different federal districts on behalf of individuals whose tires 
had not malfunctioned.79 
 
satisfy the res judicata principles underlying the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction 
Act.” Id. at 1018–19 n.9. This distinction can no longer be good law. The Canady court removed 
the lawsuits filed in state court pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), a 
practice that the Supreme Court later foreclosed in Syngenta Corp. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 
(2002). Now that such removal is improper, the Canady approach is not viable. Federal courts 
cannot enjoin state proceedings on the basis of standing alone because state courts can, without 
infringing upon the Constitution, “issue advisory opinions or . . . determine matters that would 
not satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal courts that an actual ‘case’ or 
‘controversy’ be presented for resolution.” N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 
1, 8 n.2 (1988). 
 76. See, e.g., Recent Case, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2038 (2004) (“Though perhaps well-
intentioned, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling diverges too far from fundamental legal and 
constitutional principles . . . .”); Young, supra note 11 (noting how the case “bowled over 
attorneys with its sweeping—and, some say, wrongheaded—curtailment of state court authority 
to certify nationwide classes after a federal court has declined to do so”). 
 77. E.g., Caroline E. Mayer & Carrie Johnson, Firestone to Recall More Tires, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at E1; cf. ADAM PENENBERG, TRAGIC INDIFFERENCE: ONE MAN’S BATTLE 
WITH THE AUTO INDUSTRY OVER THE DANGERS OF SUVS (2003) (telling a story of the tire 
litigation from the perspective of one plaintiff’s personal injury lawyer). 
 78. E.g., Alison Gregor, Tire Trial: Settlement in McAllen, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Aug. 25, 2001, at A1. Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone chose to litigate other suits, such as a 
Nebraska wrongful death suit filed when a woman was abducted and killed after her Ford 
Explorer’s Firestone tires failed, leaving her “alone and stranded.” See Stahlecker v. Ford 
Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Neb. 2003); id. at 257 (upholding the dismissal of the lawsuit 
because the “criminal assault constituted an efficient intervening cause which precludes a 
determination that negligence on the part of Ford [or] Firestone was the proximate cause of the 
harm which occurred”). 
 79. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATX II & Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 1373, 2000 WL 33416573, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 24, 2000). The MDL order noted that one of 
the purposes of federal court consolidation is to “prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings 
(particularly with respect to overlapping class certification requests).” Id. 
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After these actions were consolidated, the reviewing district 
court, sitting in Indiana, certified a nationwide class involving more 
than sixty million tires, three million vehicles, and sixty-seven tire 
design specifications,80 concluding that Indiana choice-of-law analysis 
would apply a single state’s law to the entire class.81 The Seventh 
Circuit reversed and ordered the class decertified, holding it “so 
unwieldy . . . that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a 
price that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if 
not more than, the actual merit of the claims.”82 The Supreme Court 
later denied certiorari, closing a two-year battle over certification in 
the MDL proceeding.83 
Almost immediately after the Seventh Circuit ordered the class 
decertified, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed similar lawsuits in a number of 
state courts. “One state judge certified a nationwide class on the day 
[that the] complaint was filed, without awaiting a response from the 
defendants and without giving reasons.”84 When the defendants 
petitioned the district court for injunctive relief, Judge Sarah Evans 
Barker dismissed the request on just the moving papers, calling such 
relief “extraordinary” and “unprecedented.”85 The Seventh Circuit 
 
 80. The numbers concerning the scope of the class are drawn from the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 81. In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., ATX, ATX II and Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503, 513 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 82. Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d at 1016. 
 83. Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). The Court denied 
certiorari on January 13, 2003. Id. Plaintiffs first sought class certification in the MDL 
proceeding on February 2, 2001. In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., ATX, ATX II and Wilderness 
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. at 516. 
 84. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2003). The district court later identified this 
case as Davison v. Ford Motor Co., No. 00-C2298 (8th Cir. Ct. of Tenn. 2000), and held it within 
the scope of the Seventh Circuit’s certification-blocking injunction. See In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tire Prods. Liab. Litig., No. IP 00-9374-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373, at 1 
(S.D. Ind. July 18, 2003) (clarifying notice in aid of the injunction of July 18, 2003). This 
document and all of the district court’s orders cited in this Note are available online at the 
Southern District of Indiana’s website, http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestone/default.htm, 
which features a searchable database of the MDL docket and other helpful information about 
the litigation. 
 85. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. IP 00-9374-C-B/S, MDL No. 
1373, at 2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2003) (order denying motion to enjoin class proceedings). The 
district judge commented that “the flaws in [the defendants’] position are obvious and many,” 
id. at 3, noting that “it should have been perfectly obvious” that other class actions would be 
filed in state courts, id. at 7, and that the defendants relied on an “assertion that . . . plainly 
rest[ed] on a mischaracterization of the bounds of the Seventh Circuit’s decision [in Bridgestone 
I],” id. at 4. The district judge refused the defendants’ injunction on the moving papers alone, 
without briefing, promptly finding “no basis for granting this extraordinary” relief. Id. at 2. 
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then partially reversed Judge Barker, issuing an injunction to prevent 
putative plaintiffs and their lawyers from pursuing certification of a 
nationwide class.86 The Seventh Circuit noted that litigants still could 
bring individual suits and statewide classes but just could not 
“represent a national class of others similarly situated.”87 
Focusing on the negative policy implications of multiple 
certification battles, Judge Frank Easterbrook noted that refusing to 
issue an injunction gave plaintiffs a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” 
advantage.88 “A single positive [the one judge who will certify a 
nationwide class] trumps all the negatives [the many judges who 
refuse to certify].”89 The Seventh Circuit justified its order to issue a 
certification-blocking injunction on the basis of the relitigation 
exception to the AIA, holding that its decertification in Bridgestone I 
was “sufficiently firm” to warrant the preclusive effect of an 
injunction.90 
III.  THE DOCTRINAL VALIDITY OF FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS  
AGAINST PUTATIVE CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURT 
As an unprecedented decision, Bridgestone II may be an 
anomaly in class action jurisprudence.91 This Note argues, however, 
that to prevent state courts from intruding into properly federal 
matters and unfairly burdening defendants, federal courts can and 
should issue certification-blocking injunctions in appropriate 
circumstances. 
As discussed in Part II, courts have used the “necessary in aid of 
jurisdiction” exception to the AIA to enjoin competing class actions 
through the settlement-protecting injunction.92 In these cases, a 
federal court already has certified a nationwide class or is close to 
approving a settlement, and then issues an injunction against state 
 
 86. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d at 769. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 767. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. Barring a successful collateral attack, the Bridgestone/Firestone consumer claims 
class litigation concluded in July 2003 when a Texas state court approved and certified a 
nationwide settlement class at the defendants’ request. See, e.g., Myron Levin, Tire Maker to 
Add Safety Features to Settle Suits, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at A-26 (noting that the settlement 
included a $19 million payout to the plaintiffs’ lawyers and a $15 million consumer education 
plan). 
 91. See supra Part II.B (discussing cases in which courts refused to issue such injunctions). 
 92. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
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interference with that settlement. By contrast, the “necessary in aid of 
jurisdiction” exception would not cover the certification-blocking 
injunction. Because the court issuing the injunction does not wish to 
exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class, the court has no 
jurisdiction in need of aid. 
The relitigation exception to the AIA, by which a federal court 
may enjoin state court proceedings “to protect or effectuate its 
judgments,” provided the basis for the Seventh Circuit’s certification-
blocking injunction in Bridgestone II.93 The relitigation exception, 
which the Supreme Court has admonished federal courts to invoke 
with restraint, was “designed to permit a federal court to prevent 
state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and 
decided by the federal court” and “is founded in the well-recognized 
concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”94 Therefore, if a 
decision is entitled to preclusive effect, a court can properly issue an 
injunction over the issue that it already decided. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is established when a 
court actually and necessarily litigates an issue between parties to a 
final judgment.95 Therefore, for a certification decision to qualify for 
preclusive effect, the decision must meet the following criteria: a) it 
must be sufficiently final, b) it must decide the same issue as the issue 
to be enjoined, and c) it must be actually and necessarily decided. 
Courts must also consider the timing of injunctions. This Part explains 
the circumstances under which a denial of certification will meet all of 
these requirements. 
A. Finality of the Certification Denial 
As mentioned in Part II.B, the earlier rejections of certification-
blocking injunctions could be said to rest on lack of interlocutory 
appeal. When an order cannot be appealed, it can hardly be called a 
“sufficiently firm” judgment that warrants federal court protection. 
The recent adoption of Rule 23(f), however, made class certification 
an appealable order; thus, the certification decision seems “final” 
enough for purposes of the relitigation exception. 
 
 93. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d at 765 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000)). For a good history of 
the relitigation exception to the AIA, see George A. Martinez, The Anti-Injunction Act: 
Fending Off the New Attack on the Relitigation Exception, 72 NEB. L. REV. 643 (1993). 
 94. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988). 
 95. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) (“[C]ollateral estoppel treats as 
final only those questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.”). 
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A leading treatise, however, cautions that “[t]he relitigation 
exception generally does not encompass procedural rulings.”96 
Although generally true, this notion stems primarily from the 
practical aspects of seeking this type of injunction. Litigants who lose 
most procedural rulings will lack the incentive to start anew in a 
different state court because most procedural rulings do not change 
the face of litigation as drastically as the certification decision. The 
Bridgestone II court noted that the certification decision “determines 
the identity of the parties and the stakes of the case,” thus concluding 
that “the permissible scope of litigation is as much substantive as it is 
procedural.”97 Although Rule 23 is classifiable as “procedural” for the 
purposes of which law a federal court applies when sitting in diversity, 
the Supreme Court recently noted that “the meaning of ‘substance’ 
and ‘procedure’ in a particular context is largely determined by the 
purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”98 
Even before Bridgestone II, a few courts had already enjoined 
parties from relitigating procedural issues in other contexts such as 
discovery. For example, one circuit court allowed a federal district 
court to enjoin plaintiffs from using evidence brought out in discovery 
in a state forum, so as “to prevent unnecessary or vexatious 
litigation.”99 Another court explained that “the Anti-Injunction Act 
does not bar courts with jurisdiction over complex multidistrict 
litigation from issuing injunctions to protect the integrity of their 
rulings, including pre-trial . . . discovery orders.”100 If decisions 
surrounding the proper scope of discovery are sufficiently final for the 
purposes of the AIA, by analogy certification decisions must be as 
well. 
 
 96. 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 121.08[3], at 121-46 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 97. Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d at 768. 
 98. Jinks v. Richland Co., 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003) (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 
U.S. 717, 726 (1988)). 
 99. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1961); see also In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 261 F.3d 355, 368 (3d Cir. 2001) (relying on Sperry to uphold an 
injunction preventing the plaintiffs from engaging in discovery). 
 100. Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1996). The Winkler court 
actually reversed the injunction for abuse of discretion, because the district judge had not 
reviewed the allegedly privileged document in camera before enjoining the plaintiffs from 
pursuing discovery in state court. Id. at 1204. The court explicitly held, however, that the AIA 
permits the issuance of injunctions in multidistrict litigation to protect pretrial orders, id. at 
1203, and allowed the parties to file for a narrower injunction, id. at 1206. 
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Similarly, numerous courts have upheld injunctions against state 
proceedings after the federal forum determined that the case should 
be submitted to arbitration.101 At their most basic level, injunctions 
against both future class certifications and litigation in state forums 
after arbitration is ordered are fundamentally the same: a federal 
court enjoins a state court from litigating issues after a federal court 
determination that such litigation would be improper. 
Furthermore, another court has ruled that questions surrounding 
the adequacy of representation in the class action context, when 
answered in the affirmative, are sufficiently final for the purposes of 
the relitigation exception to the AIA.102 The court ruled that opt-out 
plaintiffs could be enjoined from pursuing a legal malpractice claim 
against class counsel because the court’s decision to approve a class 
settlement necessarily entailed a determination that the class counsel 
adequately represented all interests.103 
B. Issue Similarity 
Assuming that a denial of certification is sufficiently final, the 
issues presented before a federal court deciding the certification 
question must be the same as the issues in any putative class action 
that the court plans to enjoin. In Bridgestone II, the Seventh Circuit 
did not discuss this “same issues” requirement, instead relying 
exclusively on section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments.104 This section, entitled Requirement of Finality, states 
that “for purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished from merger 
and bar), ‘final judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue 
in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be 
accorded conclusive effect.”105 The problem with the Seventh Circuit’s 
 
 101. See, e.g., Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 894 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
injunction at issue was necessary to protect the district court’s judgment); Kelly v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that federal 
courts have the authority to enjoin arbitration to prevent litigation); Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v. 
Woodmar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1976) (concluding that an injunction was 
appropriate to effectuate the district court’s judgment). 
 102. Thomas v. Powell, 247 F.3d 260, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 103. Id. The opt-out plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that “the class action attorneys ‘sold 
out’ their clients” and “engaged in collusive secret negotiations to the detriment of their 
clients.” Id. The district court’s decision to approve the class settlement “squarely decided” 
these questions, and thus an injunction was appropriate. Id. 
 104. See Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978)). 
 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978). 
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analysis is that the finality requirement is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, requirement of issue preclusion. Also required is an actual 
and necessary determination of the same issues over which a party 
later seeks to assert preclusive effect.106 
1. “Semantic” Differences? Most state class action rules are 
modeled after or are identical to Federal Rule 23, at least before its 
1998 and 2003 amendments.107 A state court may, however, interpret 
its rule differently, even when its rule is identical to Rule 23.108 The 
existence of different standards of interpretation led the Second 
Circuit to refuse to give preclusive effect to a “state court’s ruling that 
[an earlier suit] in that court could not be maintained as a class 
action.”109 In doing so, the court recognized that “issues are not 
identical when the standards governing them are significantly 
different.”110 The Second Circuit focused on the significant differences 
between New York’s interpretation of its class action statute, which 
required that “the complaint allege a wrong against the class as a 
class,” and Federal Rule 23, under which certification “is usually 
warranted when individual wrongs are alleged to have been pursuant 
to a common plan.”111 
This significant difference was the focus of the Second Circuit’s 
decision; implicit in the court’s analysis is that minute differences in 
interpretation do not destroy issue similarity. Another court 
 
 106. See, e.g., id. § 27 (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a 
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination 
is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim.”); cf. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) (“[C]ollateral estoppel treats as final 
only those questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.”). 
 107. See Rory Ryan, Note, Uncertifiable?: The Current Status of Nationwide State-Law Class 
Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 469 n.3 (2002), for a listing of state class action rules and their 
similarities and differences to Rule 23. 
 108. See, e.g., Morgan v. Deere Credit, 889 S.W.2d 360, 367–68 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (noting 
both the “difference in some of the rules, [and that] those rules that are identical sometimes 
have been applied differently by Texas courts” to reject giving preclusive effect to a federal 
court class action determination); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of 
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1114 n.206 (1996) (“[E]ven if one court rejects class 
certification, there is generally no collateral estoppel effect on the ability of a second court in a 
different jurisdiction to consider certifying the class.”). GM II, see supra notes 72–74 and 
accompanying text, also notes that “our construction of Rule 23 and application to the 
provisional settlement class is not controlling on the Louisiana court, because it is not bound by 
our interpretation of Rule 23.” 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 109. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 733. 
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recognized the importance of similarity in interpretations of class 
action procedural rules in holding that “a party cannot avoid the 
preclusive effect of a denial of class certification . . . [by] pointing to 
largely illusory differences between statutes that are designed for 
essentially identical purposes.”112 That court discussed how “semantic 
differences” in state and federal rules were not “considered” when 
courts, both state and federal, determine the preclusive effect of 
denials of certification.113 When state class action rules are interpreted 
substantially similarly to the federal class action rule, a court may 
properly issue an injunction, but only to the narrow extent that the 
state rules are similar. 
2. Constitutional Implications. Recognizing differences as 
merely semantic, however, cannot justify an injunction against all 
nationwide classes. Those forums that do offer substantial differences 
from Federal Rule 23 will quickly become visible and emerge as class 
action magnets. To alleviate the problems of competing putative 
classes, then, federal courts must issue injunctions following denials of 
certification that are based on an issue that stays the same, regardless 
of the forum. That issue is compliance with the United States 
Constitution. 
Constitutional issues are often implicated in class adjudication, 
but courts usually do not undertake an explicit constitutional analysis 
when denying certification, relying instead exclusively on Rule 23.114 
Failure to mention explicitly the constitutional underpinnings of Rule 
 
 112. Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 823 (S.D. Ga. 1987). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Failing to decide explicitly the constitutional issue within the context of statutory 
review is the preferred method of appellate review. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (“‘[F]ederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious 
doubt of their constitutionality.’ Where such ‘serious doubts’ arise, a court should determine 
whether a construction of the statute is ‘fairly possible’ by which the constitutional question can 
be avoided.” (citations omitted)). This method of relying on statutory interpretation to save an 
otherwise unconstitutional statute does not prevent constitutional issues from deciding the 
appropriateness of class action relief. Indeed, the Court’s class action jurisprudence often 
centers around constitutional issues. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807, 
822 (1985) (deciding personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues on constitutional grounds); 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1940) (constitutionalizing the adequacy of representation 
determination). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373 (2000) (describing the 
Court’s adequacy of representation requirement as an “embryonic theory” because of the 
Court’s issuance of “[f]act-sensitive and rule-dependent decisions that shrink from announcing 
any broad constitutional norms,” suggesting that the Justices “effectively whisper ‘Rule 23 does 
not authorize that,’ rather than proclaim ‘Due Process forbids that’”). 
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23’s requirements, however, should not prevent a federal court from 
enjoining putative class plaintiffs from relitigating those same 
constitutional issues. Implicit in many denials of certification is a 
recognition that any decision rendered by class adjudication would 
not be entitled to enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit and 
Due Process Clauses.115 Professor Edward F. Sherman explains: “In 
evaluating case aggregation, perhaps the most compelling concern is 
whether the lack of individuation so affects the quality of decision-
making that it denies fairness and due process. Clearly due process is 
denied if the aggregated case is unmanageable . . . .”116 Professor 
Sherman then explains that the class action requirements are aimed at 
insuring that the case is manageable and that “the jury will be able to 
make discriminating judgments without being unduly confused.”117 
Aggregative litigation often quickens adjudication, but many 
times at the expense of individual concerns. If individualized justice is 
obscured by a class action, certifying the class violates the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that “the Constitution recognizes higher values 
than speed and efficiency.”118 Even if a state court deems efficiency 
more important than processing individual defenses or claims, the 
Constitution may require otherwise. This basic principle has been 
constitutionalized by the Court’s requirement that class 
representatives serve the interests of the class before unnamed class 
 
 115. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”). 
 116.  Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 
REV. LITIG. 231, 251 (1991). Related to manageability is the idea that a class defendant must be 
able to defend the lawsuit against individual members of the class. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 
405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (“Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every 
available defense.”); W. Elec. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that denying 
the defendants the right to “present a full defense on the issues would violate due process”); 
S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437 (Tex. 2000) (explaining that even within class 
actions, “basic to the right to a fair trial—indeed, basic to the very essence of the adversarial 
process—is that each party have the opportunity to adequately and vigorously present any 
material claims and defenses”). 
 117. Sherman, supra note 116, at 251. Professor Sherman argues that “[p]laintiffs’ interests 
in forum selection, or defendants’ insistence on dealing individually with plaintiffs in a divide-
and-conquer strategy, may be important to them, but are not fundamental to procedural 
justice.” Id. at 253. Far more than just the loss of “strategic advantages,” id., the constitutional 
implications of class actions include choice-of-law constraints and the ability to present 
individual claims or defenses. 
 118. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
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members are bound.119 In short, adequacy of representation is a 
constitutional requirement. If a denial of certification is premised on 
fundamental conflicts that exist among class members,120 that decision 
rests on not only Rule 23(a), but also the Constitution. 
Constitutional guarantees of fairness to defendants may also 
mandate a denial of certification. For example, the Court has set 
constitutional limits on the choice of law used in class adjudication, 
requiring that the choice of law not be arbitrary or unfair.121 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts122 
prevents a forum state from changing or altering its choice-of-law 
rules merely because a case is complex. One commentator explains 
why: “Because choice of law is part of the process of defining the 
parties’ rights, it should not change simply because, as a matter of 
administrative convenience and efficiency, we have combined many 
claims in one proceeding . . . .”123 
Shortly after the Shutts decision, Professors Arthur R. Miller and 
David Crump wrote an influential article explaining the importance 
of the constitutional analysis: “The persistence of the magnet forum 
problem, after Shutts, may depend upon whether the constitutional 
standards are loosely or tightly construed. Loose requirements will 
enable the forum to prefer its own policy in derogation of more 
significant interests in other states.”124 If a federal court indicates a 
desire to have tighter constitutional standards for choice of law and 
refuses to certify a class on that basis, the denial of certification is thus 
a constitutional one entitled to preclusive effect. 
 
 119. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45–46 (holding that a party whose interests were adverse to 
class representatives could not be bound by a class action judgment). 
 120. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (decertifying a class 
under Rule 23 because of “conflicts of interests” among class members). For an overview of the 
adequacy requirement, see generally Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: 
Assuming More Than Merely “Adequate” Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927 
(2004). 
 121. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (requiring that “for a 
State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must 
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such 
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”). 
 122. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 123. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 549 
(1996). 
 124. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class 
Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 60 (1986). 
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With these constitutional choice-of-law constraints on using a 
single state’s law to determine the rights and responsibilities of all 
parties, many putative class actions, such as the one involved in 
Bridgestone II, are too unmanageable to certify.125 The potentially 
devastating effects of wide variances in state law are too significant 
for a court to ignore or leave to a “kind of Esperanto [jury] 
instruction.”126 These important manageability and choice-of-law 
concerns will often subsume the Rule 23 requirements, implicitly 
making certification a constitutional determination. 
Further, these constitutional limits on choice of law include the 
requirement that a state court not render another state’s law a nullity 
or “abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no 
relation to anything done or to be done within them.”127 Yet certifying 
a nationwide class action may indeed abrogate a defendant’s rights. 
Take the Avery128 case: holding an insurer liable for following the laws 
of other states nullifies those laws, not just in Illinois, but also in the 
forty-eight states that the certified class purports to serve.129 
 
 125. See Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[s]tate consumer-
protection laws vary considerably, and courts must respect these differences rather than apply 
one state’s law to sales in other states with different rules,” and decertifying a nationwide class 
because “a single nationwide class [was] not manageable”). A substantial body of scholarship 
has developed around the question of whether nationwide classes can ever be manageable and, 
if so, how to circumvent the conflict-of-laws problems. See, e.g., Stephen R. Bough & Andrea G. 
Bough, Conflict of Laws and Multi-State Class Actions: How Variations in State Law Affect the 
Predominance Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), 68 UMKC L. REV. 1, 3 (1999); Scott Fruehwald, 
Constitutional Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 DAYTON L. REV. 39, 43 (1998); John C. 
Anderson, Note, Good “Brick” Walls Make Good Neighbors: Should a State Court Certify a 
Multistate or Nationwide Class of Indirect Purchasers?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2019, 2030 (2002); 
Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the “Choice-of-Law Problem” in Rule 23(b)(3) 
Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 842 (2000). 
 126. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Walsh v. Ford 
Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Appellees see the ‘which law’ matter as 
academic. They say no variations in state warranty laws relevant to this case exist. A court 
cannot accept such an assertion ‘on faith.’” (footnote omitted)). Justice (then Judge) Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg pointed to “the general, unstartling statement made in a leading treatise: ‘The 
Uniform Commercial Code is not uniform.’” Id. (quoting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 7 (2d ed. 1980)). Further, consumer fraud statutes are far from identical. 
See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 484, 489 (D.N.J. 
2000) (“[T]here exist many legal variations between the states’ consumer protection laws.”); 
Lyon v. Caterpillar, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 206, 219–20 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that “each state’s 
consumer fraud act is unique” and “not uniform”). 
 127. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1928)). 
 128. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 786 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
 129. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
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Professor Scott Fruehwald has argued further that even if class 
certification passes choice-of-law muster, it does not necessarily pass 
due process muster.130 In the context of punitive damages, the Court 
has explained that “a State may not impose economic sanctions on 
violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful 
conduct in other States.”131 Although the use of due process to limit 
the size of punitive damages may be constitutionally questionable,132 
the principle underlying much of the Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area—that individual states cannot or, perhaps more appropriately, 
should not dictate policy to other states133—applies equally well in the 
class action context. Again using Avery as an example, holding an 
insurer liable for using generic replacement parts does indeed violate 
due process because it forces insurers either to use nongeneric parts, 
an expensive practice that many states discourage, or face damages 
for the insurer’s practices across the country. 
This Note does not purport to define specifically when certifying 
a class violates the due process and full faith and credit requirements 
 
 130. See Scott Fruehwald, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: Judge Jack B. Weinstein 
on Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 358 (2002) (reviewing Simon v. 
Phillip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), to conclude that class certification was 
permissible under Shutts but not under economic substantive due process). 
 131. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (holding that a state does not “have a legitimate 
concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful conduct committed 
outside of the State’s jurisdiction”). 
 132. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“I continue to believe that the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive 
damages awards.”); BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
“Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet another aspect of our Nation’s legal 
culture (no matter how much in need of correction it may be)” and arguing that the new rule is 
“constrained by no principle other than the Justices’ subjective assessment of the 
‘reasonableness’ of the award in relation to the conduct for which it was assessed”). Under a 
vision of private tort law—perhaps the more appropriate role of the court system—restraints on 
punitive damages under the Due Process Clause are “more comprehensible.” See John C. P. 
Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (And the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the debate 
over excessive punitive damages has been “misframed,” and that once properly framed—
“Whether a tolerably fair process of adjudication could generate the conclusion that the 
Campbells were entitled to extract $145 million from State Farm for what it did to them?”—the 
Court’s conclusion that State Farm was denied “minimum standards of fairness [ ] becomes 
quite a bit more comprehensible”).  
 133. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418 (“A basic principle of federalism is that each State may 
make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its 
borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on 
a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”).  
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of the Constitution. Rather, this argument rests on the fact that 
judges making certification decisions implicitly consider these 
constitutional requirements. For example, although the putative class 
was decertified in Bridgestone I because, inter alia, choice-of-law 
concerns made the class unmanageable under Rule 23(b)(3),134 this 
determination was more than just a rule-based one.135 The Bridgestone 
I court explained: 
No matter what one makes of the decentralized approach as an 
original matter, it is hard to adopt the central-planner model without 
violence not only to Rule 23 but also to principles of federalism. 
Differences across states may be costly for courts and litigants alike, 
but they are a fundamental aspect of our federal republic and must 
not be overridden in a quest to clear the queue in court.136 
In the Bridgestone consumer fraud litigation, choice-of-law concerns 
made the putative class unconstitutional, and the court’s 
determination to decertify the class was thus entitled to preclusive 
effect. A denial of certification with constitutional underpinnings 
necessarily involves the same issues as later certification decisions, 
making the denial proper for injunctive relief regardless of how 
liberally a state would interpret its own class action requirements.137 
C. Necessarily Decided? 
Courts often deny certification because plaintiffs have failed to 
prove a combination of several of the prerequisites to certification.138 
In the class action context, a judge is likely to decide the certification 
question on numerous fronts, thus implicating the debate on whether 
 
 134. See Bridgestone I, 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because these claims must be 
adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is not 
manageable.”). 
 135. See id. at 1020 (discussing how applying the “central planning model—one case, one 
court, one set of rules, one settlement price for all involved—suppresses information that is vital 
to accurate resolution”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Cf. Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting 13 (Mar. 12, 2001), at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRACMM01.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal): 
State-court certification of the same class, reaching people in many other states, may 
take on issues that no court should undertake to address in a class setting. The federal 
court, for example, may have been deterred by choice-of-law difficulties; should a 
state court be free to ignore the same difficulties, or to presume to resolve them? 
 138. See, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 
(9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he combined difficulties overlapping from each of the elements of Rule 
23(a) preclude certification in this case.”). 
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a court should grant preclusive effect to an earlier determination that 
rested on multiple, independent grounds.139 Because the requirements 
of Rule 23 often merge, however,140 a holding that certification is not 
proper for failing any, all, or some of the prerequisites should be 
treated as a single ground for the decision. One court has taken such 
an approach.141 
However, some denials of certification may be based on one 
particular factor that is easily remediable in another forum. These 
denials—if based exclusively on failing that one requirement—should 
not have preclusive effect, because a later plaintiff could fix the 
certification defect. In such cases, the denial of certification is not 
“sufficiently firm.”142 If, however, the denial of certification rests on 
both a factor that can later change and one that will not, failing the 
latter is enough to warrant preclusive effect for the denial of the 
entire putative class. 
1. Rule 23(a) Requirements. Rule 23(a) contains four basic 
requirements for class actions: numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation.143 Of these, numerosity, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation are not sufficiently firm to warrant 
preclusive effect in every case. For example, a denial of certification 
may rest on the fact that “bare allegations,” “unsupported 
 
 139. The debate and circuit split is spelled out in Monica Renee Brownewell, Note, 
Rethinking the Restatement View (AGAIN!): Multiple Independent Holdings and the Doctrine of 
Issue Preclusion, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 879 (2003). 
 140. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997): 
The adequacy-of-representation requirement “tend[s] to merge” with the 
commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which “serve as guideposts for 
determining whether . . . maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the 
named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the 
class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 
(1982). 
 141. In re Dalkon Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1116 (E.D. Va. 1985) 
(giving preclusive effect to another court’s denial of certification on the “cumulative effect” of 
23(a) inadequacies without distinguishing among them). 
 142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978). 
 143. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a): 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on 
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. 
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conclusions,”144 or “mere conjecture”—promises of more putative 
class members—will not satisfy the numerosity requirement of 
23(a)(1).145 Speculation, of course, may in time become reality; 
therefore, injunctive relief is not appropriate when a denial of 
certification is based solely on the fact that more plaintiffs have not 
materialized. Similarly, when certification is denied on a 23(a)(3) 
basis (the named plaintiff has a unique factual relationship with the 
defendant), another named plaintiff, without such a relationship, 
could be substituted in another forum where certification would be 
appropriate. Rule 23(a)(4) presents a trickier situation: the 
requirement of adequate counsel and representation can be 
remediable in another forum or even in the first court, especially 
given the court’s numerous new options for appointing counsel per 
23(g).146 Sometimes, however, a class will fail Rule 23(a)(4) because 
the interests of the class are too divergent and no representative is 
adequate. 147 Such a decision would be final.  
A decision denying certification on Rule 23(a)(2), which requires 
that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class,”148 is 
always sufficiently final: no change in circumstances could create a 
new common question of law or fact for the decertified class. 
Common questions among class members may later arise, however, if 
plaintiffs make new claims. Nevertheless, if the other requirements 
are met, an injunction preventing class treatment for the first type of 
claims is still proper because the class would be enjoined only to the 
extent that the certification decision was actually and necessarily 
decided. Narrowly defining the scope of the injunction is key. As an 
example, plaintiffs may first define a class so broadly—as x—that it 
fails to meet the commonality requirement, then later narrow the 
class enough—to y—that certification is proper.149 The injunction 
 
 144. Barlow v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 88 F.R.D. 619, 625 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
 145. Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 100 (D.D.C. 1973). 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (g) (describing procedures for appointing class counsel and providing 
for the designation of “interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative class”). 
 147. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (finding a constitutional violation 
when the plaintiffs’ class purported to represent people “whose substantial interests [were] not 
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they [were] deemed to represent”). 
 148. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(2). For (b)(3) classes (i.e., classes seeking damages), the 
commonality requirement is essentially a nullity, because common issues must predominate over 
individual issues. See id. R. 23 (b)(3); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609 (1997). 
 149. Some defendants have argued that a class is too broad to meet the commonality 
requirement but that, once the class is defined narrowly enough to possess common questions, it 
then fails the numerosity requirement. Compare Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94, 104–06 
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would govern a class defined as x, not a class defined as y, and 
therefore it would be sufficiently final and would cover the same 
issues already decided in the first decision. 
2. Rule 23 (b)(3) Requirements: Predominance and Superiority. 
Rule 23 (b)(3) damages classes are the most common—and 
controversial—classes.150 In addition to requiring common questions 
of law or fact, damages classes require that these common questions 
“predominate over any questions affecting individual members.”151 
Likewise, a class action must be “superior to other available methods 
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”152 As with 
the analysis under the 23(a)(2) commonality requirement, the (b)(3) 
shortcomings of a putative class will not magically disappear if 
presented later. More importantly, no amount of new discovery or 
better counsel can cure the deficiencies inherent in (b)(3) pitfalls, 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting the position that, once sufficiently narrowed, the class would not 
possess common questions), with Kohn v. Mucia, 776 F. Supp. 348, 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying 
certification after having narrowed the class to meet the commonality requirement because it 
was “only speculation to claim” that the class was sufficiently numerous on the particular factual 
record). A denial of certification on this basis would be proper for injunctive relief, but only to 
the extent that the court enjoined certification of a class defined too broadly. For example, in 
Kohn, a federal court determined that given the commonality requirement any putative class 
should include only “those people whose cars were older than seven years and properly 
registered when destroyed; who received no notice whatsoever; and whose then current 
addresses were on file with the Secretary of State.” Id. If the plaintiffs then filed a putative class 
action in a state court with a broader definition, the federal court could properly enjoin them. 
However, the Kohn court then determined that this narrow class was not sufficiently numerous 
to warrant certification. Id. If plaintiffs could later produce enough putative class members of 
this narrow definition to satisfy the numerosity requirement, they could properly pursue a class 
action in a different forum. See id. (implying that certification could be granted if the 
commonality and numerosity requirements were met). 
 150. 13 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:9 (4th 
ed. 2002) (“Most class actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(3).”); cf. Advisory Comm. on the 
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 21, at 28: 
It is safe to say that the eminent authors of [Rule 23(b)(3)] had little conception in 
1966 that a mere rule of joinder . . . would become such a prominent feature in the 
landscape of modern litigation, dramatically altering the stakes, scale, and outcomes 
in certain kinds of class action lawsuits. 
 151. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 152. Id. In making the (b)(3) determination, a court may consider: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the 
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a 
class action. 
Id. 
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because class-based issues will never predominate over claims with 
individualized concerns. Thus, a denial on (b)(3) grounds would be 
“sufficiently firm” for the purposes of the relitigation exception to the 
AIA.153 
Furthermore, as discussed in Part III.B.2, manageability concerns 
and choice-of-law analysis factor heavily into the (b)(3) 
determination; certification denials on this basis thus implicate 
significant due process concerns.154 These constitutional 
underpinnings create similar issues for each certification decision, 
regardless of whether a state court class action rule would require 
predominance or superiority to certify the class.155 
D. Timing Issues 
A final comment regarding the doctrinal validity of injunctive 
relief concerns the timing issues surrounding the federal injunction. 
Although rejecting the injunction before it, the Supreme Court in 
Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,156 a case not cited by the 
Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone II, provided injunction-seeking 
litigants a strong foundation for arguments in favor of relief. The 
Parsons Steel Court held that an injunction was improper when a 
state court had already decided the preclusive effect of a federal court 
judgment;157 implicit in this analysis is a recognition that federal courts 
may issue injunctions to protect their judgments under the relitigation 
exception to the AIA, absent a state court’s determination of the 
preclusive effect of the federal decision.158 This holding “creates a 
strong incentive” for successful federal litigants to seek a federal 
 
 153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1978) (“‘[F]inal judgment’ includes 
any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to 
be accorded conclusive effect.”). 
 154. See supra notes 114–37 and accompanying text. 
 155. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 150, § 13:11 (“Not all states, however, require a 
showing that a class action be superior. Illinois and Pennsylvania will permit class actions on a 
mere showing of appropriateness.”). 
 156. 474 U.S. 518, 519 (1986). 
 157. See id. (holding that a federal court may not enjoin state court proceedings when “the 
prevailing party in the federal suit had litigated in the state court and lost on the res judicata 
effect of the federal judgment”). 
 158. The basic question of Parsons Steel was whether the AIA impliedly limits the Full Faith 
and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Court held that the AIA and Full Faith and Credit 
Act could be “construed consistently, simply by limiting the relitigation exception of the Anti-
Injunction Act to those situations in which the state court has not yet ruled on the merits of the 
res judicata issue.” Id. at 524. 
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injunction against repetitive state actions immediately to avoid 
litigation of the preclusion issue in state court.159 Parsons Steel thus 
requires that any court issuing a certification-blocking injunction do 
so before a state court considers and rejects the preclusive effect of 
the federal court denial of certification.160 
CONCLUSION 
In appropriate circumstances, federal courts can and should issue 
injunctions to prevent nationwide class actions in state court. The 
effectiveness of these injunctions in solving the problems described, 
however, will be severely limited if defendants cannot get to federal 
court in the first place. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are already adept at making 
class actions “removal-proof”;161 to avoid certification-blocking 
injunctions, plaintiffs’ lawyers need only coordinate so that no one 
files a removable case. In massive litigation such as Bridgestone II, the 
temptation to file lawsuits quickly may result in quite a few “inartful” 
complaints that do wind up in federal court. In less obvious class 
actions, however, a coordinated plaintiffs’ bar may get a class certified 
in state court before a single removable case is ever filed. 
This ease of evasion suggests a legislative solution: federalizing 
most class actions by allowing removal with only a minimal level of 
diversity jurisdiction.162 Such legislation offers a far better solution 
 
 159. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 11.2, at 732 (4th ed. 2003); see also 
id. (explaining that if the preclusion issue is presented and lost in state court, “it will bar a 
subsequent federal injunction,” and that “after Parsons Steel, the person subjected to a 
repetitive suit in state court should immediately seek a federal court injunction”). 
 160. The Bridgestone II court discussed, but did not cite, how one state court, later identified 
as Davison v. Ford Motor Co., No. 00-C2298 (8th Cir. Ct. of Tenn. 2000), certified a nationwide 
class “the day the complaint was filed, without awaiting a response from the defendants and 
without giving reasons,” calling the state court’s certification an “obvious violation of 
procedural requirements” that will “ultimately be vacated.” Bridgestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 765–66 
(7th Cir. 2003); see also supra note 84. Because the Davison court certified the class before the 
Bridgestone I decertification, it did not consider whether to give the federal decision preclusive 
effect. Therefore, although not bearing on the Bridgestone II injunction, the Parsons Steel 
limitation could prove important in future cases. Notable, though, is that neither the Seventh 
Circuit, nor the district court on remand issuing the injunction specifically to cover the Davison 
plaintiffs and their lawyers, undertook this analysis. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tire 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. IP 00-9374-C-B/S MDL No. 1373, at 1 (S.D. Ind. July 18, 2003) 
(clarifying notice in aid of the injunction of July 18, 2003). 
 161. See Thomas Merton Woods, Note, Wielding the Sledgehammer: Legislative Solutions 
for Class Action Jurisdictional Reform, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 507, 511–14 (2000) (discussing 
plaintiffs’ tactics to defeat federal jurisdiction). 
 162. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003); Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003); Class Action Fairness Act of 2003,  
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than injunctive relief, given the limits of the Anti-Injunction Act, the 
need to rest denials of certification on constitutional grounds for the 
denial to be preclusive, and the difficult problems of establishing what 
is and can be precluded. As long as state courts have the power to 
adjudicate nationwide class actions, however, federal courts that have 
already found class relief inappropriate should, when the 
requirements for issue preclusion are met, enjoin putative class 
members from relitigating the certification question. 
 
S. 1751, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 483 (advocating 
the federalization of nationwide class actions to alleviate state court bias against out-of-state 
defendants). 
